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Abstract 
This Working Paper argues that the film industry is a paradigmatic example of 
how the organization of the cultural economy is shaped by balancing creativity 
with contextual issues. In the film industry, organization is far from determined 
only by creative concerns for content production: Issues of cost, chance and 
collection also play important roles. Through analyzing creativity and its 
context in the film industry, the paper explains the industry’s organization, and 
opens up for understanding its significant national and regional differences. 
The paper carries out a literature study of economic, socioeconomic and 
economic geography literature on the film industry, analyzing the importance 
of creativity, cost, chance and collection in the film industry, and exemplifies 
how these issues are balanced differently in different clusters. The analytical 
framework presented in the paper may be used to understanding different 
“models” of filmmaking. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of creativity is not just at the heart of research on cultural industries 
(e.g., Caves 2000; Hesmondhalgh 2002), it is also becoming part of a broader 
agenda related to technological innovation, the rise of “the knowledge 
economy”, and labour market dynamics (e.g., Florida 2002). It is a common 
theme in these literatures that the issue at stake is not really the creativity of 
single individuals, because this is a raw material in quite some abundance. It is 
how firms, industries, and society at large organize for creativity that is a core 
issue, and the challenge is for managers and policymakers to opt for the most 
efficient organization in order to profit from the creativity of labour and 
citizens. In the case of cultural industries, therefore, the key issue is how firms, 
labour markets, and industries are built around the raw material constituted by 
“creatives”, i.e., individuals with cultural (as well as technical) skills. However, 
as noted by Richard Florida (2002), firms and industries do not just organize for 
creativity: a range of other concerns ⎯  for example, of control ⎯  is always 
balanced against creativity, and strategies and organizations reflect how this 
balance is made and unmade. Arguably, this is also true for cultural industries: 
contrary to popular belief, cultural industries are not only organized to 
maximize creativity, creativity is very often balanced with other factors.  Hence, 
to understand the organization of cultural industries we must study creativity 
in context. By taking this into account, the study of cultural industries may well 
become inspirational to the study of creativity in other industries. 
This paper seeks to do just this. We pick an extreme case of a cultural 
industry where creativity is balanced with other concerns: the film industry.  In 
the organization of this industry, creativity is traded off against contextual 
issues ⎯ even to the extent that creativity is often subsumed under other 
concerns. Through analyzing creativity and its context in the film industry, the 
paper explains the industry’s organization, and opens up for understanding its 
significant national and regional differences.  
The paper is conceptual, carrying out a literature study of economic, 
socioeconomic and economic geography literature on the film industry, 
analyzing the importance of creativity, cost, chance and collection in the film 
industry, and exemplifies how these issues are balanced differently in different 
clusters. Hence, the paper develops an analytical framework that may be used 
for understanding different “models” of filmmaking in future comparative 
work on the film industry, but also as inspiration for other work on cultural 
industries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the film industry, 
and sketches out how different film clusters of the world perform very 
differently in economic terms. Section 3 calls for a study of organization, and of 
creativity in context, in order to understand these persistent performance 
differences of the film industry. Section 4 presents the first part of the analysis 
of what drives organization in the film industry, by discussing how creativity is 
balanced with concerns of cost. Section 5 discusses how creativity is also  
balanced by concerns of compensating for chance elements in the demand for 
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films, and section 6 presents the last part of the analysis, discussing the balance 
of creativity with concerns of collection. A short section 7 summarizes the 
analytical framework and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic Development and Performance Measures in the Film 
Industry 
The film industry is measured by its annual turnover of more than US$25 
billion in 2006 (MPAA 2007), the largest of the sectors in the cultural economy, 
and, in terms of global penetration and shaping of identities the most prolific 
(Hesmondhalgh 2002; Scott 2005). The film industry can be viewed as a 
paradigmatic case for a broader understanding of the development of cultural 
industries. On one hand, it shares its maturity and the nature of its product 
development processes ⎯  dominated by variety creation more than innovation 
(Lorenzen 2007) ⎯  with many other cultural industries, such as music, 
publishing, and arts. On the other hand, it is undergoing changes that may 
point to the future for other cultural industries, with increasing rates of product 
development, including stylistic and product innovations, as well as changes in 
its organization in terms of globalization, the performance growth of new 
clusters, and horizontal integration. Hence, the need for understanding the film 
industry is more acute than ever. 
The film industry is truly global. At the beginning of the 1900s, countries 
as different as France, Denmark, India, and the USA undertook film production 
and sales on a large scale, but with the growing importance of mass marketing 
during the latter half of the 1900s, US film production underwent significant 
organizational changes and became the most commercially successful. With a 
few notable exceptions in the UK (which is highly intertwined with US film 
production (Galina and Pratt 2007) and Asia, film production outside the USA 
is today small-scale.  At this point, we should note that even if national 
regulation − in the guise of, for example, tariffs, trade policy, tax, education, 
censorship and subsidies − greatly impacts the film industry (Moran 1996; 
Segrave 1997; de Turegano 2006; Flew 2007), the film industry has a distinct 
geography. The industry consists of production activities (preproduction 
[scripting, budgeting, casting, art design, etc]; production [shooting); and 
postproduction [editing, effects, scoring and sound]); marketing; distribution (i.e. 
sales and physical transport to cinemas and video, other sales channels); and 
exhibition (cinemas, video retail, TV, etc.) (for a more thorough presentation of 
these activities, see e.g. Vogel 2003; Wasko 2003; Eliashberg et al. 2006). 
Exhibition is localized where consumers are, but film production, marketing 
and distribution firms are to a wide extent clustered in major cities, and there 
are huge and consistent differences in output as well as in organization between 
these urban film clusters. Even if analysis of the national film industries of, for 
example, India, USA, Japan, France, UK, Italy and Denmark is interesting, even 
more insights are yielded by analyzing clusters in Bollywood (Mumbai), 
Hyderabad, Chennai; Hollywood (Los Angeles), New York; Kyoto, Tokyo; 
Paris; London; Rome, Copenhagen, and so on.  
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There are, as mentioned, notable differences between the performance and 
organization of the world’s film clusters. The first global mass medium, film, 
continues not only to have a huge cultural impact, but also to be an industry 
with a notable potential for economic development. When that is said, how do 
we measure a cluster’s potential for economic development? 
 
Revenues 
Measuring the revenues of film firms is a direct way of measuring national or 
regional economic performance. With US accounting for almost half of the 
world’s box office (Screen Digest Newsletter 2007) and with the film production 
companies with the highest revenues (such as Universal, 20th Century Fox, 
Paramount, Columbia, MGM, Warner Bros., and Walt Disney) located in 
Hollywood, this cluster is the undisputed world top performer in terms of 
revenue collections. Kyoto/Tokyo (Japan) and London (UK) follow. 
Unfortunately, even if organizations such as the Motion Pictures Producers’ 
Association of America and European Audiovisual Observatory seek to collect 
comparable statistics from national statistical offices and consultancy agencies 
(such as Screen Digest and Nielsen EDI), statistics are poor and difficult to 
compare across countries and regions (and the measurement of revenues is 
further complicated by the fact that media corporations and distributors 
register their turnover in other countries than films were revenues are 
produced).  
 
Employment 
While the number of jobs in the film industry captures economic performance 
in terms of economic activity, it does not necessarily indicate it in terms of 
economic growth, as employment is not necessarily a sign of revenue collection. 
While Hollywood, Bollywood and other Asian film clusters are biggest in terms 
of size of their labour pool and number of jobs, a range of film clusters 
undertaking runaway production tasks (Wasko 2003), typically outsourced 
from Hollywood, now experience booming employment. Examples are 
Vancouver (Canada), the Gold Cost (Australia) and Wellington (New Zealand), 
all undertaking the late stages in preproduction and shooting (Coe 2001; Coe 
and Johns 2004; Scott 2005; Flew 2007), and Manila (Philippines) and Bangalore 
(India) undertaking animation, EFX and postproduction. However, these 
clusters typically release few or no films themselves, and the outsourcing 
production companies, typically in Hollywood, London, or Bollywood, capture 
the rights to, and hence the revenues from, the finished products.  
 
Releases 
The total number of films released first and foremost reflects market size in 
terms of exhibition infrastructure (number of screens), cinema attendance, and 
purchase power. With huge home markets, clusters in India, USA, Japan, and 
China release most films annually (see Table 1). The clusters with the biggest 
markets have typically bifurcated their film releases: in addition to the many 
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films produced for niche audiences (e.g. art house or religious films, 
documentaries, or more mainstream films failing to reach mass audiences for 
reasons we shall discuss later), these clusters also release a lower number of 
films targeting mass audiences. Even if fewer in number, these films account for 
the bulk of revenues. The hugely successful mass market segments of 
Hollywood and Bollywood films are best known, but we see bifurcation into 
niche vs. mass market mainstream films in most clusters with a high number of 
releases. 
However, a large number of film releases does not necessarily indicate that 
a cluster has developed a commercially successful mass market segment, nor 
does it point to performance in terms of competitiveness or revenue collection. 
Due to state subsidies, clusters in some small European countries release an 
impressive number of films ⎯  in fact, Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland and 
Sweden release many more films per capita than non-subsidized and 
commercial clusters elsewhere.1 Hong Kong is a rare example of a non-
subsidized film cluster releasing many films per capita (in 2005, only Iceland 
released more per capita) (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Film releases 
Number of films 
released 2005 
Number of films released per 
million capita 2005 
1:  India (1,041) 
2:  USA (699) 
3:  Japan (356) 
4:  China (260) 
5:  France (240) 
6:  Russia (160)  
7:  Spain (142)  
8:  UK (124)  
9:  Germany (103)  
10: Bangladesh (102)  
 
13: Korea (82) 
16: Hong Kong (55) 
21: Denmark (41)  
 
1:  Iceland (10.17)  
2:  Hong Kong (7.98)  
3:  Denmark (7.58)  
4:  Switzerland (6.48)  
5:  Sweden (5.99)  
6:  Slovenia  (5.04)  
7:  Luxembourg (4.39)  
8:  Norway (4.18)  
9:  France (3.96)  
10: Spain (3.28)  
 
14: Japan (2.79) 
19: USA (2.36) 
22: UK (2.06) 
24: Korea (1.70) 
38: India (0.93) 
64: China (0.20) 
Source: ScreenDigest (2006) 
                                                 
1 Munich (Germany) is another subsidized cluster that has also been releasing an increasing number of 
films per capita during the last decade (Kaiser and Liecke 2007). 
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Home market share 
Releasing many films per capita does not necessarily entail capturing large 
home market shares (often measured as domestic films’ share of gross box 
office revenues in the home market, and also called “self-sufficiency ratio”). 
Home market share measures economic performance in terms of different kinds 
of competitiveness. First, competitiveness in terms of the experience value (see 
section 4) of the content of films can be important for winning the home market. 
State subsidies and high-value content of films have allowed French, Danish, 
and Italian clusters to successfully compete against imports, capturing notable 
shares of their home markets (see Table 2). Second, competitiveness in terms of a 
protected position through trade policies or language barriers may also lead to 
large home market shares, as is the case for film clusters in India and China and 
the Seoul (Korea) cluster. Third, a large home market share may also be a sign 
of competitiveness in terms of marketing and distribution capabilities. The 
unmatched home market share of Hollywood has been achieved through a 
combination of home market protection, high production values of Hollywood 
mass market films, and Hollywood firms’ unparalleled marketing and 
distribution capabilities.  
Whether big home market shares result in notable economic development 
depends upon the purchase power of the home market. The wealth of the US 
home market compared to markets in India and China explains why the high 
home market shares and many releases of Indian and Chinese clusters do not 
translate into economic growth comparable to Hollywood’s. 
 
Table2 : Home market shares 
Share of home market 2005 
1:  India (94.1%) 
2:  USA (93.4%)  
3:  China (60%)  
4:  Korea (57%)  
5:  Turkey (41.4%)  
6:  Japan (41.3%)  
7:  France (37.7%)  
8:  Thailand (35%)  
9:  UK (34%)  
10: Hong Kong (31.4%)  
11: Denmark (30.1%)  
 
Source: ScreenDigest (2006) 
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Exports 
Arguably, a film cluster’s exports have a notable economic development 
potential, as exports capture revenue and prolong windows of earning beyond 
the home market. Of course, the economic potential of exports depends upon 
the ratio of the purchase power of home vs. export markets: a cluster with a 
poor home market may increase its revenues notably by a modest increase in 
exports to rich markets, whereas a cluster with a rich home market exporting to 
poorer markets needs a sizeable increase of exports (and possible an increase in 
the number of export markets) in order to increase revenues significantly 
(Hoskins and Mirus 1988; Hoskins et al. 1997; Vogel 1998) For example, 
Bollywood’s recent export growth may be modest, but it aimed at a few rich 
Western markets and caused a revenue boom. By contrast, Hollywood’s export 
revenues were built up over many years and entailed a lot of investments in 
many markets, because purchase power outside the USA is relatively low. 
Exports indicate competitiveness of a film cluster in several dimensions. 
First, export may indicate the competitive content of films. This is reflected in 
the list of major exporters to the combined EU-US markets in 1999 where 
Belgium, Brazil and Denmark are featured prominently (see Table 3). However, 
exports based on film content alone may fluctuate a lot from year to year. For 
clusters with a low number of releases, export rates are highly influenced by 
single, successful films (as was exactly the case in 1999 for Belgium, Brazil and 
Denmark in Table 3). Second, exports may also reflect a cluster’s cultural 
competitiveness, or the preferences of consumers for particular film narratives, 
aesthetics or, more simply, language (Hoskins and Mirus 1988; Papandrea 1998; 
Doh 2001). A look at the EU (12) market in 2004 indicates that, while USA still 
has the undisputed highest market share (71.4%), France (9.5%), UK (6.1%), 
Germany (4.5%), Italy (2.2%) and Spain (2.1%) capture audiences with other 
preferences than English language and Hollywood-type narratives (Newman-
Baudais 2005). However, 1999 figures (Table 3) show that outside the home 
market, UK is a stronger European exporter than France: cleansed for home 
market sales, big-budget, English-language films produced in USA and UK 
capture the greatest share of the combined EU-US market. Third, exports of 
course also reflect a cluster’s competitiveness in terms of capabilities. As any 
cluster typically exports only a fraction of its releases, a strong global 
distribution network is essential to match indigenous films in various markets, 
and good marketing is important to overpower them. 
However, a high export rate (typically measured as the percentage of 
revenues stemming from export markets) does not unequivocally indicate that a 
cluster has developed content-based, cultural preference-based, or capability-
based export capabilities. This is because many film clusters enjoy state 
subsidies, not just for production, but also for export activities. In the EU, there 
is governmental export support at EU level, for both smaller and larger film 
clusters (de Turegano 2006), and in Asia, Hong Kong is also beginning to attract 
government export support. Even if the world’s most exporting film cluster, 
Hollywood, operates without government subsidies, its export success has been 
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positively influenced by government regulation. Because exports would boost 
domestic scale economies, the US State Department, the Department of 
Commerce, and various US embassies have traded strategically in film and 
paved the way for US film exports to Europe through the Marshall aid and EU 
disputes, and to Asia through GATT (Segrave 1997; Ulff-Møller 2001; Scott, 
2005). 
 
Table 3: Exports 
Admissions (cleansed for home market admissions) on the combined 
US-EU markets 1999  
1:  USA (536,7 millions) 
2:  UK (103,5 millions) 
3:  France (27,8 millions) 
4:  Italy (24 millions) 
5:  Japan (18 millions) 
6:  Canada (7,5 millions) 
7:  Spain (6,5 millions) 
8:  Hong Kong (4,8 millions) 
9:  Germany (4,3 millions) 
10: Denmark (3,1 millions) 
11: Brazil (2,4 millions) 
 12: Belgium (1,7 millions) 
13: Russia (1,4 millions) 
14: India (1,3 millions) 
Note: Apart from USA, UK, France and India, size of exports was 
determined mainly by the success of one film. 
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory (2006) 
 
 
3. Organization and Performance 
Performance differences 
Not surprisingly, Hollywood stands out as the top performing film cluster in 
most of the dimensions mentioned above. Even if several Asian clusters employ 
more people and the clusters in India release more films, Hollywood has many 
releases not just on a wealthy home market where it completely dominates, but 
also on all global markets, including those with highest purchase power: Japan 
and the EU (Segrave 1997). This translates into revenue. As mentioned, clusters 
in Kyoto/Tokyo (Japan) and London (UK) are next best performing with 
respect to revenues, but because of the distribution of two other performance 
measurements, the position of these clusters may be eroding. First, the rapidly 
growing purchase power on the home markets completely dominated by 
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Indian and Chinese clusters is in the process of raising the revenues of these 
clusters. Second, the rapidly increasing export rates of a range of European as 
well as Asian clusters are stealing market share from London as well as 
Hollywood. Given the modest number of releases of Hong Kong and Seoul 
(Hong Kong had 55 and Korea 82 in 2005 [Screen Digest 2006]), the recent 
export boom of these clusters hardly threatens London or Hollywood. 
However, the slow but steady export rise of the hugely productive Bollywood 
cluster, moving beyond its traditional Asian and African export markets and 
successfully targeting EU and North America, may turn this cluster into a 
future major player with respect to economic development (Lorenzen and 
Taeube 2007). 
What is the cause for the performance differences of film clusters? As 
hinted at above, four factors external to the clusters play a role. First (in some 
cases) FDI influences employment. Second, cinema attendance and purchase 
power on home markets precondition the number of film releases. Third, 
cultural consumer preferences on foreign markets influence exports. And 
fourth, public policy plays a role for the home market share and exports of 
many, if not all, film clusters. However, external factors alone cannot explain 
performance differences. Concerning the first external factor, FDI, what 
determines if a cluster receives or makes it? Why is Manila a recipient of FDI 
and Bollywood an investor, when both clusters have sizeable labour pools and 
low labour costs? Second, concerning home market size, what determines 
whether a cluster takes advantage of it? Why have Indian film clusters invested 
more in exhibition infrastructure (cinemas) than Chinese when India has fewer 
inhabitants with lower purchase power; and why does Bollywood release more 
films than Hollywood when USA’s cinema attendance and purchase power is 
much higher than India’s? Third, what determines consumer preferences for 
imported films? Why do consumers in Korea prefer Hollywood films to films 
from Asia or France, with whom Korea has much more trade and interaction, 
and, by the same logic, why do consumers in Finland prefer Hollywood films to 
Swedish or Russian? And finally, why do some countries, like Denmark and 
Korea, seem to benefit so much more from public subsidies and promotion than 
others? 
 
Integration and market organization 
The answer to these questions is, of course, organization. Even if there may be 
external preconditions for employment, the number of releases, home market 
shares, and exports, it is the internal organization of the film clusters that 
determines if they benefit from advantageous external conditions, or even 
invest in slowly changing them. Furthermore, organization greatly influences 
the major determinants of home market share and exports: the content 
(experience value) of films, and the marketing and distribution capabilities used 
for selling films. According to Wildman and Siwek (1988) and Wildman (1995), 
it was the horizontal integration and scale economies in Hollywood’s production 
activities that made this cluster win large home market share and export so 
much. Hoskins et al. (1997), on the other hand, suggest that it was Hollywood’s 
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vertical integration of production, distribution, and exhibition, which was the 
key driver of US dominance on world film markets. This dominance may 
become self-reinforcing through cultural advantages. Gradually, if a powerful 
horizontally and vertically integrated film industry sinks sufficient investments 
into marketing and distribution over sufficiently long time, it may change 
consumer preferences in foreign markets (Hoskins and Mirus 1988; Vogel 1998; 
Elberse and Eliashberg 2003). The preferences on many national markets for 
English language films over other foreign language films (Doh 2001), and for 
Hollywood-type narratives and aesthetics, have been created by Hollywood 
itself. The greater cultural differences there are among the world’s other 
exporting film clusters, the greater the cultural advantages of Hollywood 
(Papandrea 1998). 
This issue of integration ⎯ whether firms choose to internalize particular 
tasks and transactions through ownership and long-term employment contracts 
⎯  is classic in the economics of organization (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; 
2000). But organization is not just a question of where the boundaries of firms 
(hierarchies) go; it is also about how, in the absence of integration, firms 
“organize the market” instead (Richardson 1972; Langlois 1986; Maskell and 
Lorenzen 2004). Market organization encompasses the institutions other than 
ownership that may coordinate and manage tasks and transactions among firms, 
such as projects, alliances, and social networks. 
Even if home market size, policy, and so on, also play important roles for 
performance differences between clusters, the clusters’ differences in terms of 
the extent and nature of horizontal integration (scale), vertical integration (joint 
ownership of several activities in the value chain), as well as the extent and 
nature of transactions among firms and people in projects, alliances, and 
networks (for example, recurrence, collusion, and whether they are strategic or 
short-term), take centre stage. 
 
Creativity and its context in organization 
So, what drives organization? Why are different clusters organized differently? 
In the sections that follow, we analyze the factors behind organization in the 
film industry. Recently, scholars have dedicated growing attention to the role of 
creativity in cultural industries ⎯ the volume to which this working paper has 
been submitted being an example of this research strand (see also Caves 2000; 
and Hesmondhalgh 2002). Creativity is also controversial among cultural 
industry observers, some arguing for the growing importance role of creativity 
(“content is king”), some arguing in the opposite vein that in the organization 
of mass-consumer cultural industries, creativity has long been subsumed under 
other concerns.  
The following analysis of the film industry suggests a middle way. It 
argues that creativity plays a necessary role for the organization of the film 
industry, but that there are different ways of trading creativity off against logics 
of cost, chance and collection. We will here sketch how the film industry 
organizes for, around, and some times against, creativity. This shapes the 
different organization, and ultimately performance, of the world’s film clusters. 
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4. Creativity vs. Cost 
Creativity: Project organization of production 
Cultural consumer industries (such as music, games, publishing and arts) 
produce experience goods (Nelson 1970), in the sense that even if products are 
often developed with much involvement, dedication and integrity of creative 
labour or even artists, their market value ultimately hinges upon how their 
content is experienced by consumers (Pine and Gilmore 1999; Cowen 2000). The 
film industry is no exception, as the market value in cinemas, TV, and video of 
its core product, the feature film2, depends on how the audience judges the 
narrative and aesthetic content of the film. This judgment, and hence the market 
value, of a film is related to the degree by which the aesthetics and narrative of 
its content differentiate themselves (Burke 1996) from incumbent films on the 
market. To have experience value, a film needs to differentiate its content in 
terms of both narrative and aesthetics: a differentiated aesthetics, obtained 
through a particularly high production value or a stylistic innovation, applied 
to a well-known narrative, has often proved valuable. 
The film industry produces differentiated content by differentiating 
creative inputs. A film is an immensely complex product, integrating numerous 
art forms (such as writing, design, and performing arts), and the scope for 
combining the inputs in order to achieve new content varieties are, in Caves’s 
(2000) words, infinite (see also Eliashberg 2006). Most content development of 
films is in reality the production of variety through recombining inputs (and 
proper innovations in the guise of new styles or whole new ways of marketing 
or distribution are rare) (Lorenzen 2007). In order to thus recombine inputs, 
films productions are organized as projects ⎯  temporary and flexible groupings 
of skills and other inputs with given budgets and deadlines (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995; Hobday 2000; Lorenzen and Frederiksen 2005) and the end 
goal of producing a feature film. 
The necessary skills for a film project are often so specialized into narrow 
creative, technical, and managerial realms that they are held by individual 
experts: creatives (e.g. writers, designers, choreographers, actors, directors), 
technicians (e.g. editors, cinematographers, lighting technicians) and managers 
(e.g. producers, line producers, controllers, accountants, financiers, and 
marketers), working concurrently and successively on a film (Wasko 2003; 
Eliashberg et al. 2006). A film project is typically set up and controlled by a 
production company where the producers, marketers, and sometimes the 
financiers, are long-term employed. 
 
Creativity: Horizontal disintegration of production 
In the pre-WWII period, cost concerns typically overrode creativity in the 
                                                 
2 Definitions of ”feature film” vary, but the US Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences define it as 
a film longer than 40 minutes. 
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organization of film projects. As a result, not just managers, but also creatives 
and technicians, were employed long-term in large “studios” ⎯ a somewhat 
misleading term, as these production firms integrated all aspects of production, 
not just studio facilities. Prior to WWII, there were integrated film producers in 
many different clusters, including Copenhagen (the integrated film company 
Nordisk Film), Paris (the companies Gaumont and Pathé) Bollywood (Prabhat, 
Wadia, Bombay Talkies and other companies), and of course Hollywood (the 
“seven sisters” − Columbia, Walt Disney, 20th Century Fox, MGM, Paramount, 
Universal and Warner Bros.). The advantages of this horizontal integration of 
production was mostly in terms of planning of resource use with parallel film 
projects, and Hollywood, with the biggest home market and number of release 
of all clusters, was able to make the most out of such scale economies (Wildman 
1995). Scale of production also encompassed re-use of concepts and brands in 
successive projects: the integrated film companies had huge success with 
producing low-budget films and serials (for example, Bollywood’s Fearless 
Nadia and Hollywood’s Kings of Comedy series) (Chisholm 2003). 
TV, which was introduced on a large scale in the US in the 1950s, in 
Europe in the 1960s, and in most parts of Asia in the 1980s, quickly took over 
the market for low-budget films and serials (Chisholm, 1993; de Vany and 
Eckert 1991; de Vany and Walls 1999). In addition, the increasing purchase 
power and heterogeneity of markets in the US and Europe since WWII has 
changed demand for films: film audiences now wanted high production value 
and high product variety.  This demand for variety, and hence for more varied 
inputs to projects, undermined the internal economies of planning and carrying 
them out in-house (Lorenzen and Frederiksen 2005). The profits of the 
integrated production companies in Europe and Bollywood had already been 
eroded by WWII, Bollywood’s incumbent production companies saw a huge 
entry after Indian independence, and the business model of Hollywood’s 
integrated production companies ⎯ combining horizontal integration of 
production with vertical integration of distribution and exhibition (see the 
section below) ⎯ was punctuated by an anti-trust High Court ruling in 1948. As 
a result of these combined pressures, after WWII, production disintegrated in 
many of the world’s film clusters, into a flexibly specialized production model 
of small-scale independent production firms and numerous specialized 
suppliers (Robins 1993; Storper 1989), and a labour market of freelancing 
creatives and technicians (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Storper and 
Christopherson, 1987; Blair 2001). This model allowed for much higher variety 
of film aesthetics and narratives, and in Hollywood, the growing skill levels of 
specialized suppliers also raised production values. 
The horizontal disintegration of production was also spurred by the 
integrated production companies’ problems of motivating labour in long-term 
employment. New small production companies and a thickening labour market 
offered both creatives and technicians attractive freelance alternatives to long-
term contracts: Freelance work, or the option to start up own companies. The 
tendency to go freelance was most prominent for star actors, and from the 
1950s, they broke out of their long-term contracts with production firms in 
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many clusters, including Hollywood and Bollywood. The disintegration of 
production was thus the beginning of an era where star actors became 
independent, but also (as shall be discussed in the next section) powerful.  
According to classic economic logic (Smith 1776), the horizontally 
disintegrated system of production should make those world’s film clusters 
with the largest labour pools, such as Hollywood, Paris, London and the 
clusters in India, particularly competitive with respect to creativity. The size of 
their internal market for projects and labour should, ceteris paribus, allow for the 
high specialization of firms and labour, and hence deepening of firm 
competences and labour skills. Even if it may be subject to controversy whether 
all clusters take due advantage of the potential for creativity offered by the size 
of their labour pool, it is true that the film clusters that perform well in terms of 
number of releases have sufficient reputation to create significant backwash 
effects for talent. Hollywood, Bollywood, Paris and London remain magnets for 
film talent from a regional or even global hinterland, constantly adding to these 
clusters’ stock of specialized firms and the density of their labour markets. 
However, with targeted (often public) investments in education, some clusters 
that are smaller in terms of both employment and number of releases are able to 
boost skill levels beyond what their size would allow for in a pure market logic. 
For example, public education in the Copenhagen and Rome clusters has made 
skills in scriptwriting and direction at least at par with the huge market-driven 
cluster of Bollywood, where investments in public film education are very 
modest.  
 
Cost: Horizontal ecologies and small world networks of production 
A disintegrated organization of production is beneficial to creativity in the film 
industry, but also raises the question of how production companies may 
manage film projects that cross the companies’ boundaries, using more 
freelancers than long-term employees. In the design of projects “on the market” 
(Lorenzen and Frederiksen 2005), there seems to be a trade-off between 
maximizing creativity and minimizing transaction costs. The optimal design in 
terms of variety and differentiation vis à vis earlier projects is to use as many 
new creative (and possibly also technical) skill holders as possible. However, the 
creative benefits of using new skill holders must be balanced against the costs 
of using strangers who may shirk or cheat (Williamson 1975; 2000). To 
minimize such transaction costs, it makes better sense if the producer signs 
creatives and technicians with whom he has a relation because they have 
worked with him before.  
This trade-off between creativity and cost is typically solved by producers 
through social networks. Producers sign new people who they may not have 
worked with before, but whom they can find and whose past performance they 
can check, through relations to other people who have worked with them 
before. This informal way of hiring, checking and controlling new people is 
possible because of the geographical clustering of film production and labour 
markets. Film clusters are project ecologies (Grabher 2002) of skill holders who 
are constantly combined and recombined in new film projects. Because of this 
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constant recombination of people, ecologies get socially structured into dense 
and ever-growing social networks constituted by friendships and 
acquaintanceships made in earlier film projects. In such networks, reputation 
effects and sharing of information may allow participants to a new project to 
achieve swift trust (Meyerson et al. 1996), even if none of them have worked 
together before. There is evidence for how film projects are thus based on social 
networks in Hollywood (Baker and Faulkner 1991; Sorenson and Waguespack 
2006); Rome (Soda et al. 2004; Delmistri et al. 2005), and Bollywood (Lorenzen 
and Taeube 2007). 
We argued earlier that film clusters with big labour pools have particular 
creative potentials, by virtue of the size of their internal markets for labour and 
projects. We can now see that whether a film cluster realizes its potential for 
taking advantage of its variety of local competencies and skills depends upon 
the social structure of its project ecology. If the social networks of the cluster are 
in collusion, there is much re-use of skill holders, and less variety of film 
aesthetics and narratives. If the social networks, on the other hand, provide 
access to many new skill holders in each new film project, creativity may 
blossom. The bifurcation of clusters with many film releases into a segment of 
niche films and a segment of mainstream films also typically means social 
bifurcation ⎯ the rise of one network of skill holders who mainly participate in 
the production of niche films, and another network of skill holders who mainly 
participate in mainstream film production.3 If these two social networks are cut 
off from each other, bifurcation entails a division of a cluster’s project ecology 
into smaller and less varied markets for labour and projects. If, on the other 
hand, the social networks centered around niche and mainstream film 
segments, respectively, are coupled to each other by a few central people who 
work in both film segments, such as eclectic actors or directors, the cluster’s 
ecology is socially structured so that it allows for higher creativity. The 
coupling of different internally densely knit social networks to each other 
through a few crucial social relations is called a small world network (Milgram 
1967; Watts et al. 2002). In a film cluster, such a social structure allows for 
minimizing transaction costs in the majority of project relations (which are 
carried out internally in dense networks where people know about each other 
and can easily build trust), while boosting creativity in a few crucial project 
relations that cross over to other networks and access the information and skills 
found here (Granovetter 2005; Uzzi and Spiro 2005). As will be discussed 
below, while Bollywood has historically been more of a collusion than 
Hollywood, as its mainstream network was relatively closed to outsiders, 
Hollywood is now moving towards more collusion while Bollywood is opening 
up. Bollywood may be moving towards greater creativity and Hollywood 
towards less. 
 
                                                 
3 In Hollywood, there is even evidence that there is a third network of skill holders related to porn films, 
clearly distinguishable from the networks of skill holders involved in mainstream and niche non-porn 
films. 
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Cost: Outsourcing 
While transaction costs may be kept at bay through social networks, even with 
horizontal disintegration, production costs of most film projects have exploded 
over the last decades, due to the demand for ever more production value and 
the salaries of star actors (see below), in combination with the lack of scale 
economies of planning after the horizontal disintegration of production. Several 
of the clusters with big-budget productions, including Hollywood, London, and 
Bollywood, are now outsourcing labour-intensive production tasks to clusters 
with lower labour costs, such as Vancouver, Australia’s Gold Cost, and 
Wellington. This ”runaway” mode of organization (Wasko 2003) mostly 
concerns the technical aspects of production, leaving creative tasks in the home 
cluster. While this growing aspect of the organization of the film industry thus 
influences creativity of the outsourcing clusters little, it also bears only modest 
development potential for those clusters receiving runaway production tasks 
(as mentioned in section 2, see Coe 2001; Chaminade and Vang 2007). 
 
5. Creativity vs Chance 
Chance: Horizontal network collusion and integration of production 
Like other cultural products, films have a highly uncertain demand. In film 
clusters as different as German (Jansen 2005), Indian (Kohli-Khandekar 2006; 
Lorenzen and Taeube 2007), and US (Vogel 1998; de Vany and Walls 1997; de 
Vany 2004; Eliashberg et al. 2006), less than 20 per cent of films break even, and 
much fewer make notable revenues. The demand for art house or other niche 
films is limited, but it varies on a relatively predictable scale (Cameron 2003). It 
is mass markets that are really uncertain. Growth, globalization, and increased 
consumer spending on experience goods since WWII have created global mass 
markets for feature films with potentially huge revenues, and this has facilitated 
the rise of mass market film segments in the clusters with most releases. 
However, mass markets are also characterized by unforeseeable ⎯ and rapidly 
changing ⎯ consumer tastes and infinite variance of revenue distribution (de 
Vany and Walls 1997; Sawhny and Eliashberg 1996; Walls 2005). Hence, in mass 
markets for films, “nobody knows anything” about demand (a phrase coined 
by the scriptwriter Goldman [1983] and empirically addressed by a range of 
scholars, for example in a 2005 special issue of Journal of Cultural Economics).  
Economists of an evolutionary stance (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Rosenberg 1992) often associate demand uncertainty, producing and marketing 
to the firm-level process of experimentation: developing new products without 
whether they will sell or not, and subsequently testing them on consumers over 
limited (if often flexible) test periods (Raubitschek 1988; Kerke and Srinivasan 
1990). Such experimentation with producing mass market films can be costly. 
With life cycles of mass market films shortening (the dramatic shortening of a 
film’s life span in movie theatres has not yet been compensated for by the 
prolongation of windows of earning on TV and video), there is significant 
pressure on production companies within the mass market segments to develop 
new films at a rapid pace, which further increases the potential costs of 
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experimentation. Consequently, the incentives for production companies in the 
mass market segment for compensating for the aspect of chance are great. This 
impacts upon the organization of not just the mass market segment, but the 
entire film industry. 
One means of compensating for chance is the use of stars ⎯  that is, 
creatives with proven consumer appeal and high brand value ⎯  in the 
production and marketing of mass market feature films. Worldwide, the most 
prominent stars are actors, but to some extent, directors (and, in Bollywood, 
composers) are also gaining star status. Contrary to common belief among film 
producers and marketers, there is little evidence that star actors systematically 
increase the likelihood of box office performance (de Vany and Walls 1996; 
1999; 2004). However, their brand value for attracting investments remains 
huge in Hollywood as well as Bollywood (de Vany and Walls 1996; 1999; 
Elberse 2006; Lorenzen and Taube 2007), and their salaries have increased to 
constitute half of some mass market films’ budgets. A disproportional number 
of film projects centres around the most branded star actors and directors (some 
stars are even in a position to fund and produce own film projects). However, 
this centering does not necessarily inhibit creativity. Quite the opposite, the use 
of stars may reinforce the small world properties of a cluster’s social network. 
For example, in both Hollywood and Bollywood, some star actors or directors 
who are highly paid in the mass market segment occasionally work for much 
less in more artistically satisfying projects in the niche segment, thus coupling 
the skill holders in the two segments who are otherwise segregated into a small 
world network.4 
Another means to compensate for the element of chance in demand for 
mainstream films is by producing sequels. Whereas stars are used in both mass 
market and niche films, the production of sequels is a strategy  used almost 
exclusively in mass market films. As mentioned, the use of stars alone does not 
efficiently compensate for chance. However, the re-use of a star cast in 
combination with the brand value of a previous box office success has proved a 
much more successful success formula (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003). Today’s 
serials do not resemble the low budget productions of Hollywood and 
Bollywood 50 years ago:  Spiderman 2 or Pirates of the Caribbean 2 are top of the 
range productions, with the most expensive stars, lavish production value, and 
often technical virtuosity.  Their box office success notwithstanding, as sequels 
prioritize brand value over novelty, they also prioritize compensating for 
chance over creativity. They encompass not only the re-use of a star cast but 
also writers, directors, producers, and sometimes also designers and some 
technical staff, thus lowering the variety of narratives and aesthetics.  
 
Chance: Horizontal integration of marketing ⎯  and vertical integration of 
production into marketing 
                                                 
4 Folklore often describes Kevin Bacon as ”the centre of the Hollywood universe”, but actually, Rod 
Steiger has highest centrality in Hollywood’s small world network, according to University of Virginia 
Computer Science Department’s Oracle of Bacon, www.oracleofbacon.org/center_list.html 
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The box office collections of niche films depend mainly upon the films’ content, 
and this content often encompasses widely varied narratives and novel 
aesthetics. Due to the limited budgets for advertising, niche films typically need 
to signal the experience value of their content at film festivals, through critical 
reviews (Caves 2000; De Vany 2004), and at award shows (awards being 
important for niche films on both big and small markets (de Vany 2004; Jansen 
2005)). The ultimate aim for a niche film is to create sufficient word-of-mouth 
“buzz” and reputation to convince theatre owners and other exhibitors to take 
the film on. This slow and cheap mode of marketing of niche films corresponds 
to their long windows of earning and low collections. 
The collections of mass market films, on the other hand, depend primarily 
on good targeting of particular audience segments (age, class, race, sometimes 
also religion), and good timing of release (as these films often target moviegoers 
at particular holidays and coordinate their timing to competitors’ releases). The 
experience value of mass market films often encompasses high production 
value and/or formulaic narratives. Huge marketing campaigns signal this 
experience value of new releases to target audiences, aiming at creating 
hoarding effects (Caves 2000; de Vany 2004). Large-scale marketing also serves 
to achieve nominations for major commercial awards (but not necessarily 
winning them) (Deuchert et al. 2005), and ultimately convincing theater owners 
of the market potential of new releases, paving the way for exhibition at just the 
right time. In sum, large-scale marketing is an efficient means of compensating 
for chance (Prag and Casavant 1994; Eliashberg et al. 2006), and its value grows 
with market size (Lee and Waterman 2006). 
There are notable scale economies in marketing, as the marginal costs of 
e.g. promotion campaigns decrease rapidly (Caves 2000; Chisholm 2003). The 
larger the market, the larger the endogenous sunk costs represented by 
marketing (Sutton 1991; Bakker 2005) and the more prominent the scale 
advantages: for example, Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) argue that Hollywood’s 
large-scale marketing on the huge US home market forms a necessary platform 
for the global marketing of Hollywood films.  
Due to these scale economies and sunk costs, the film industry often sees 
notable horizontal integration in marketing ⎯ the dominance of a few, 
powerful marketing firms. With respect to scale economies and horizontal 
integration, film marketing is very different from film production, which, for 
reasons discussed above, is organized in disintegrated projects. Hence, in many 
film clusters, production firms and marketing firms stay separate, the former 
employing the latter. However, in a few clusters with a big commercial 
segment, such as Hollywood and London, producers of mass market films have 
integrated mass marketing. The Hollywood pre-WWII major production 
companies did not just integrate production horizontally, they also integrated 
marketing, distribution, and exhibition vertically, and boasted large-scale 
marketing departments, distribution networks, and theatre ownership. As 
mentioned, demand developments and creative concerns after the 1950s led to 
the horizontal disintegration of production, and the 1948 US High Court ruling 
forced vertical disintegration of exhibition, but the major Hollywood film 
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companies remained powerful in marketing and distribution (for a discussion 
of the latter, see below). They developed core competencies in finance, 
marketing, and distribution ⎯  outsourcing production to specialized 
subsidiaries or even to “independent” production companies, occasionally 
buying and marketing niche films with potential mass appeal. Such vertical 
integration of production with marketing is a costly, but also efficient response 
of a few powerful firms to the high demand uncertainty on mass markets, and 
as pointed out by Hoskins et al. (1997), this organization of Hollywood’s mass 
market segment is a key explanation for the export success of this film cluster. 
Ever since WWII, the growing marketing power and the gradual 
development into media conglomerates of these Hollywood major film 
companies have shaped the development of not just Hollywood, but the entire 
film industry. For the mass market segment, it represents a further compromise 
regarding creativity for the sake of compensating for chance: Producers of mass 
market films in, for example, Hollywood or the UK, who are also first and 
foremost marketing firms, focus increasingly upon marketing and are gradually 
less prone to experiment with variety. In the niche market segments, creativity 
is not compromised by this organization of the mass market segment, but, as 
will be outlined below, the competition for exhibition ⎯  and ultimately 
survival ⎯  in all of the film industry is significantly stiffened by the 
organization in the few large clusters’ mass market segments. 
 
Chance: Horizontal integration of distribution ⎯  and vertical integration 
of production and marketing into distribution 
Distribution of niche films and mass market films functions quite differently. 
Because the main selling point of niche films is their content, they are often long 
in production and postproduction, and can take long after completion to find 
distributors targeting the right niche markets. The success of mass market films, 
on the other hand, is hugely dependent upon scale of exhibition and timing of 
release (which sometimes leads mass market films to be rushed through post 
production): opening in many screens simultaneously ⎯  “block booking” ⎯  is 
a way of propagating hoarding effects while crowding out competing films 
(Donahue 1987; Caves 2000). This means that efficient, large-scale distribution is 
immensely important to take advantage of mass marketing. 
As in marketing, there are also advantages in large scale distribution, 
given the decreasing marginal costs of for example, physically transporting 
prints, and keeping contact with theatre owners (Caves 2000; Chisholm 2003). 
Scale ⎯  spreading risk over a large number of films ⎯  is also a means by 
which distributors can compensate for chance (Cameron 2003). Scale economies 
have driven integrated organization of distribution in smaller clusters, such as 
Denmark or Korea. Here, a few large distribution firms distribute for all 
production companies. The sunk costs represented by distribution are, like 
marketing, also endogenous, so ceteris paribus, larger markets should render 
horizontal integration efficient (Sutton 1991; Bakker 2005). However, this is not 
the case for all clusters with big home markets: whereas Hollywood is 
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dominated by a few powerful distributors of mass market films, Bollywood 
continues to demonstrate disintegration, with hundreds of small-scale 
independent distributors. 
One explanation for the horizontally integrated organization of 
distribution in Hollywood is that the media conglomerates which integrate both 
production and marketing have also vertically integrated into distribution, 
driven firm sizes up here, and raised entry barriers against newcomer 
distributors (Caves 2000). The reason for this vertical integration of production 
and marketing into distribution is simple: it is the ultimate way of 
compensating for chance. Controlling distribution, integrated production and 
marketing companies can ensure preferential treatment of their own films in the 
best (first-run) theatres (Vogel 1998) and systematically use block booking as 
competitive strategy (Hanssen 2000). The Hollywood media conglomerates 
have used these effects to a wide extent during the last two decades of the last 
century. As these conglomerates now also re-invest in exhibition (buying 
theatres as well as TV channels), hence compensating even more for chance 
while appropriating residual earnings from successful films (Chisholm 2003), 
scholars such as Schatz (1997) refer to “the return of the Hollywood studio 
system” of the pre-WWII period. Through their unique control over marketing 
and distribution, these new conglomerates are able to completely finance their 
own film productions, as well as ensuring them large-scale exhibition.  
To the extent that media conglomerates also facilitate the distribution of 
niche films, horizontal integration of distribution, and vertical integration of 
production and marketing into distribution, does not necessarily negatively 
influence creativity as such. However, if niche films are denied distribution for 
strategic reasons, this organization of a film cluster adversely influences the 
diffusion of niche films produced with a comparatively high emphasis on a 
variety of inputs, narratives and aesthetics ⎯  and ultimately the survival of 
firms in the niche film segment. As we shall see below, in some film clusters, 
the distribution of collaborations between niche producers and media 
conglomerates is becoming rarer still. 
 
Chance: Horizontal integration of production 
With a scale sufficient to finance, market, and distribute own film productions 
(as well as the occasional “independent” film), the major Hollywood media 
conglomerates of the late twentieth century pursued a strategy of releasing 
different types of films simultaneously, compensating for chance by spreading 
risk across different films. While the high horizontal as well as vertical 
integration in the mass market segment of Hollywood put some competitive 
pressure on niche producers, there was, as mentioned, some collaboration 
between the segments, allowing for finance, marketing and wider distribution 
of the occasional niche film, and the maintenance of a small world social 
network coupling creatives across segments.  
However, there are signs that the mass market segment in Hollywood and 
others among the big commercial clusters, such as London, is moving towards 
an organization that further prioritizes compensating for chance over creativity. 
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As mentioned above, mass market segments in many clusters currently produce 
a rising number of sequels, in an attempt to compensate for chance. Many 
sequels are also examples of a third recent strategy for mainstream films, 
flagpole productions. Earlier, managers and economists (e.g. de Vany 2004) 
agreed that budget size did not necessarily increase chances of box office 
success, but some of today’s films with more than double the average 
production and marketing budget have proven able to sweep the tables, as well 
as create brand value for use in subsequent TV shows, video games, music, 
books, and so forth.5 Given the size of their production budgets, as well as their 
necessary scale of marketing, distribution, and collection (see below), flagpole 
productions are only undertaken by the biggest film production companies that 
are a part of large media conglomerates. Over the last five years, the strategy of 
flagpole productions has added to the horizontal integration of production in 
Hollywood and the UK, because the big production companies tend to finance 
fewer, but larger productions. As flagpole productions are designed to 
minimize experimentation, and as they imply the integration of production, 
they clearly represent a strategy that prioritizes compensating for chance over 
creativity. As documented by Scott (2005), in Hollywood, this results in 
collusion and still less coupling between the parts of the bifurcated cluster, with 
fewer films ⎯  and more of them own productions ⎯  financed, marketed and 
distributed by major conglomerates, and niche producers left with still more 
difficulties in achieving finance, marketing, and distribution. However, 
Bollywood looks a bit different: even if flagpole productions are now also seen 
here, the cluster’s disintegrated industry structure means that this strategy does 
not lead to noteworthy changes in how creativity is balanced with 
compensation for chance in the cluster as a whole. 
 
6. Creativity vs. Collection 
Collection: Cross-industry integration 
The basic value of feature films lie in the property rights to them, and the 
collection of the payment for using such rights has always been a part activity in 
film distribution. However, such rights, and collection on the basis of them, are 
becoming an increasingly complex and much growing business in itself (for 
discussions, see Caves 2000; and Andersen et al. 2007). Whereas for the first 
century of the film industry, copyrights ⎯  the use of rights to copies of the 
feature film ⎯  were central to earnings, a range of auxiliary revenue streams is 
now arising from further rights. The rights to parts of the feature film product 
are now also sold and re-sold. A classic example is soundtracks, but to an 
increasing extent, other parts of successful mass market films, such as the 
scripts (and re-make rights), characters, and art design, are also sold separately. 
                                                 
5 The average combined production and marketing costs of a Hollywood film was 
US$100.3 million in 2006 (MPAA 2007). Spiderman 2 cost an estimated US$200 
million and collected US$784 million worldwide. Pirates of the Caribbean 2 cost an 
estimated US$225 million and collected over US$1 billion worldwide (IMDB.com). 
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This has created specialized firms in the guise of publishing houses, which 
typically administer, sell, and collect fees based on rights. 
There are notable scale economies (diminishing marginal costs) in trading 
with and collecting fees from rights, and quite similarly to marketing and 
distribution activities, these scale advantages grow with market size. There are 
also synergies of selling use rights in bundles, and of targeting multiple outlets 
with bundles of rights. For instance, the rights to the storyline and character of 
Spiderman can be sold to TV production companies wanting to produce a show 
based on the feature film, toy and (computer) game producers, book publishers, 
and so on. Consequently, publishing houses are often big, they often administer 
rights not just in films, but also in music, plays, books, and more, and they have 
often grown to spanning globally.  
Not surprisingly, the integrated media corporations in Hollywood and 
other large film clusters are also integrating into publishing. As the media 
conglomerates focus more and more on how they can collect from existing 
successful films (such as sequels and flagpole productions), they also focus 
upon the efficient administration of property rights to these films, creating and 
capturing as many auxiliary revenue streams as possible. Investing in the media 
industries where synergies of rights are most profound, US, UK, German, 
French and Japanese media conglomerates are now turning into multi-media 
conglomerates, integrating the production, marketing, distribution (and to 
some extent also exhibition) of films, TV, music, computer games, book 
publishing, and more (Litman 1998). The “return of the studios” (Schatz 1997) is 
in reality the rise of a new breed of global multi-media conglomerates, 
organized around rights and collection. 
This increasing focus upon collection in the mass market segments of 
Hollywood and other of the big commercial clusters complements their 
increased focus upon sequels, flagpole productions, and brand value. As 
mentioned above, this also represents a shift in balance away from creativity, 
since the result is fewer mass market films with less variety, as well as higher 
entry barriers for niche films to marketing and distribution. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
The sections above have sketched the main drivers of organization in the film 
industry. The basic argument is that different clusters’ different economic 
performance in the film industry is related to how these clusters organize as a 
means of balancing concerns for creativity, cost, chance, and collection. As far 
space has allowed, the sections have also exemplified how different clusters 
balance these concerns: 
• The concern for creativity ⎯ consumer demand for differentiation of 
content (aesthetics and narrative) ⎯  drives project organization. 
Arguably, this type of organization is ubiquitous in all film clusters. 
• The concern for creativity ⎯  variety of inputs ⎯  drives disintegration of 
production activities and use of new and varied freelancers and firms. Whereas 
all clusters have functionally disintegrated production activities, the 
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major production companies in some of the biggest clusters maintain a 
relatively higher level of control over production than many other 
clusters, owning them or writing multi-film contracts with them. 
• The concern for lowering transaction costs drives the emergence of small 
world social networks in project ecologies. But whereas some clusters are 
well coupled internally, others are less so, to some extent hampering 
creativity. 
• The concern for lowering labour costs drives outsourcing from some 
clusters in high-wage countries to new peripheral clusters, but this 
impacts creativity little. 
• The concern for compensating for chance in demand drives the increasing 
use of stars in most clusters, but as this may strengthen small work network 
structures, this has not per se an adverse effect on creativity. 
• The concern for compensating for chance drives the increasing number of 
sequels in most clusters with mass market segments, and this leads to 
network collusion, impacting adversely upon creativity. 
• The concern for compensating for chance drives horizontal and vertical 
integration of marketing in Hollywood, and until recently, this has not 
hugely counteracted creativity. 
• The concern for compensating for chance drives horizontal and vertical 
integration of distribution in Hollywood, and until recently, this has not 
had any major adverse effect on creativity either. 
• The concern for compensating for chance drives the increasing number of 
flagpole productions in some clusters with mass market segments and 
hence increased horizontal integration of production, compromising 
creativity to some extent. 
• The concern for collection of auxiliary revenues from multiple rights in 
different industries has created cross-industry integration and multi-media 
conglomerations in some of the world’s biggest clusters, with potential 
negative impacts on creativity. 
While film as a cultural endeavor is recognized as a global phenomenon, many 
film scholars have equated film as an industry with Hollywood. However, there 
is clearly not just a Hollywood industrial model of commercial filmmaking; 
there are other models. Even if all commercial filmmaking models balance 
creativity, cost, and collection issues, they do so in different ways. We have 
briefly exemplified how clusters in, for example, Bollywood; Hollywood; 
Kyoto/Tokyo; Paris; London; Rome, and Copenhagen have developed 
differently. Even if the drivers of organization are the same, chance and local 
historical events have set these clusters on different paths, and future 
comparative work should take on the challenge of systematically comparing 
them. The analytical framework presented in this paper is, hopefully, a useful 
tool for such cross-cluster comparisons in the film industry, but may also give 
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hints as to how studies of the organization ⎯  and the historical development of 
such organization ⎯  in the world’s cultural industries can be conducted in the 
future. 
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